Commentary: Puzzles about Corporate Boards and Board Diversity by Langevoort, Donald C.
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Volume 89 | Number 3 Article 6
3-1-2011
Commentary: Puzzles about Corporate Boards and
Board Diversity
Donald C. Langevoort
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina
Law Review by an authorized administrator of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Donald C. Langevoort, Commentary: Puzzles about Corporate Boards and Board Diversity, 89 N.C. L. Rev. 841 (2011).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol89/iss3/6
COMMENTARY: PUZZLES ABOUT




Those who seek greater gender or ethnic diversity on corporate
boards of directors work under the self-imposed burden to show that
board-level diversity adds value to the firm in some tangible way. In a
perfect world, board diversity follows naturally from the fair
distribution of talent and skill between the genders and among
ethnicities when selection is based on merit. But our world is grossly
imperfect, with residual bias (conscious and implicit), a long legacy of
discrimination and inequality, and pervasive, artificial, and self-
serving social construals of what merit-based selection means. In this
imperfect world, sadly, the strategy of claiming and documenting the
economic value of diversity seems to be strategic necessity.
Unfortunately, the value added by board diversity is hard to
prove with any rigor, as the indeterminate findings in the extensive
empirical literature on the subject-including some of the
contributions to this conference-amply demonstrate.' To be sure,
the intuitions seem persuasive enough. If one treats the corporate
board as a work group, under the right circumstances having differing
perspectives and differing backgrounds should prompt more creative
problem-solving and blunt the tendencies toward "groupthink."2 And
as stakeholder groups (employees, customers, suppliers, etc.) become
more diverse, having board members who are especially attuned to
their interests and values should be productive and also send a
positive signal of firm sensitivity.
* @ 2011 Donald C. Langevoort
** Thomas Aquinas Reynolds Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center.
1. For a review, see Deborah L. Rhode & Amanda K. Packel, Diversity and
Corporate Boards: How Much Difference Does Difference Make? 4-8 (Rock Ctr. for
Corporate Governance, Working Paper No. 89, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1685615.
2. See, e.g., Lisa M. Fairfax, The Bottom Line on Board Diversity: A Cost-Benefit
Analysis of the Business Rationales for Diversity on Corporate Boards, 2005 Wis. L. REV.
795,831-37.
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So why is it so hard to find tangible evidence of added value? My
commentary will focus on two of the conference contributions: the
wonderfully interesting field study by Broome, Conley, and Krawiec
("BCK"), who asked board members to talk about their own
observations of value added by having more diversity on corporate
boards,3 and the intriguing empirical study by Dobbin and Jung
("DJ"), who try to explain troubling evidence that both share value
and non-blockholding institutional ownership appear to drop when
women are added to boards, even though there is no evidence that
firm financial or accounting performance declines as a result.' Before
turning specifically to these, however, I want to explore briefly what
may be a cause of the muddle-the fact that we have no coherent,
consistent explanation for how boards themselves add value to the
firm. Without knowing what boards really do in terms of economic
value, it is hard to develop and test any useful hypothesis about their
diversity.
I. WHAT EXACTLY Do BOARDS Do?
Legal scholars have long expressed frustration over the inversion
between how the law says corporations are governed (absolute board
primacy) and how they seem to be run in fact (managerial primacy).'
Business scholars, who carry less normative baggage, seek simply to
explain what is observed in practice.6 The prevailing accounts suggest
three realistic possibilities for what boards actually do, which are not
mutually exclusive.'
The first account-the so-called monitoring board, whose roots
are in financial economics-holds that the function of the board is to
select, retain, and compensate the senior executive team, as agents on
3. Lissa L. Broome, John M. Conley & Kimberly D. Krawiec, Dangerous Categories:
Narratives of Corporate Board Diversity, 89 N.C. L. REV. 759, 760 (2011).
4. Frank Dobbin & Jiwook Jung, Corporate Board Gender Diversity and Stock
Performance: The Competence Gap or Institutional Investor Bias?, 89 N.C. L. REV. 809,
833-34 (2011).
5. See, e.g., MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION
2-3 (1976).
6. For an excellent recent survey of the economics literature, see generally Renee
Adams et al., The Role of Boards of Directors in Corporate Governance: A Conceptual
Framework & Survey, 48 J. ECON. LIT. 58 (2010).
7. For more on these accounts, see Amy L. Hillman & Thomas Dalziel, Boards of
Directors and Firm Performance: Integrating Agency and Resource Dependence
Perspectives, 28 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 383, 384-88 (2003); Donald C. Langevoort, The
Human Nature of Corporate Boards: Law, Norms and the Unintended Consequences of
Independence and Accountability, 89 GEO. L.J. 797, 801-05 (2001).
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behalf of the company's equity shareholders.' When carried out
faithfully, this means fairly careful oversight, as is the assumption in
private equity arrangements where there is a single "owner" of the
firm who selects expert monitoring directors. However, agency cost
problems resulting from dispersed share ownership can result in
managerial capture of the board, rendering it impotent and irrelevant
as a monitor.' Even where there is no capture (or incomplete
capture), monitoring might be compromised by informational and
resource deficiencies, and maybe behavioral biases as well.o
Moreover, intense monitoring might simply set in motion a more
contested negotiation between management and the board, which in
the end could be costly to the firm and its shareholders."
The second account-the resource-dependency model, with its
roots in the sociological literature-claims that the board (or
corporate governance generally) is mainly a mechanism for gaining
for the firm the resources necessary for survival and success.12 Board
members are selected for their network connections with key
constituencies." The best-known example here would be political
connections: banks, defense contractors, and others who are highly
dependent on government goodwill famously have former regulators,
former members of Congress, and former generals and admirals on
their boards. 4 Where capital resources are important to the firm's
strategic direction, directors with ties to the capital marketplace and
the investor community will be valuable.
8. Langevoort, supra note 7, at 801-02.
9. For an example of this theme, see generally LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED,
PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE
COMPENSATION (2004) (arguing that the lack of arm's length bargaining between
directors and executives has led to an inability of directors to limit executive
compensation).
10. See Langevoort, supra note 7, at 806-09.
11. See Benjamin Hermalin & Michael Weisbach, Endogenously Chosen Boards of
Directors and Their Monitoring of the CEO, 88 AM. ECON. REV. 96, 96-97 (1998); James
D. Westphal, Board Games: How CEOs Adapt to Increases in Structural Board
Independence from Management, 43 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 511, 512-13 (1998); see also Donald
C. Langevoort, Resetting the Corporate Thermostat: Lessons from the Recent Financial
Scandals About Self-Deception, Deceiving Others and the Design of Internal Controls, 93
GEO. L.J. 285, 304-08 (2004) (discussing the possible negative implications of a corporate
board's intensive monitoring of CEO performance).
12. See Hillman & Dalziel, supra note 7, at 386-88.
13. See id.
14. See generally Anup Agrawal & Charles Knoeber, Do Some Outside Directors Play
a Political Role?, 44 J.L. & ECON. 179 (2001) (arguing that outside directors with political
and legal backgrounds play important roles on boards of firms that must engage with
government regulatory agencies).
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The third account is the advisory board." Here, the main job of
the board is to advise the CEO (and perhaps other senior managers)
on the strategic direction of the firm, bringing a more objective,
experienced perspective on the firm's challenges than what the
insiders might believe.16 This is hard to account for theoretically, since
the same function can be played by professional management
consultants without encumbering the board with the responsibility.
But survey data indicate that this is the function board members think
they are performing most of the time.17
From this mix, one can appreciate the difficulty of discovering
tangible value in board diversity. To be sure, there is the potential for
value in terms of more creative group decision making under the
monitoring model, or through network connections where key
constituents of the firm are diverse. On the other hand, if there is a
high degree of managerial capture, as so many fear, then the group
decision making is of lesser significance in any event. And network
connections under the resource dependency approach are not limited
to board seats; a defense contractor might choose higher lobbying
expenditures over adding a former admiral. Instead of an additional
woman on the board, a firm might hire and feature a new woman vice
president for marketing-or bring in a powerful woman as outside
legal counsel. In other words, there are always close substitutes in the
world of corporate governance. Board membership will never be the
only or even the best reflection of how the firm might incorporate
diversity into governance.
As to the advisory function (and perhaps an active monitoring
board as well), the most plausible working hypothesis is especially
muddled. There are downsides to diversity because diverse teams are
less likely to reach consensus, and take more time to do so if they
do.'" Interesting research by James Westphal suggests that the
advisory function is most effective when the CEO feels relatively
strong social connections to board members." To the extent that
15. See Langevoort, supra note 7, at 802-03.
16. Id.
17. See Adams et al., supra note 6, at 64-66.
18. For a discussion, see David Charny & G. Mitu Gulati, Efficiency Wages,
Tournaments, and Discrimination: A Theory of Employment Discrimination Law for
"High-Level" Jobs, 33 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 57, 66-67 (1998).
19. See generally James Westphal, Collaboration in the Boardroom: Behavioral and
Performance Consequences of CEO-Board Social Ties, 42 ACAD. MGMT. J. 7 (1999)
(arguing that close personal ties between CEOs and board members encourage CEOs to
actively seek advice from the board); James Westphal & Edward Zajac, Who Shall
Govern? CEO/Board Power, Demographic Similarity and New Director Selection, 40
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comfort comes from similarity, then diversity of various sorts-
including extreme board independence-might lower the efficacy of
the advice.
All this discussion assumes, artificially, that diversity and ethnic
and gender differences are tightly coupled. But of course there is no
guarantee that bringing a woman or person of color onto the board
will offer anything of the sort. The traits, tendencies, and experiences
that produce diversity are unevenly distributed within the genders
and ethnicities-famously, there are women and people of color who
will think and act in the most stereotypically white male fashion.
Social pressure to diversify a board as against incumbent preference
for board homogeneity (for whatever reason in light of the above
discussion) might make such persons highly sought after, but they will
bring no appreciable diversity impact on the quality of the board's
work.20
II. BROOME, CONLEY, AND KRAWIEc: DIVERSITY STORIES
BCK collect a fascinating set of stories told for the most part by
board members themselves about the value of diversity. Their main
finding is an almost universal assent to the value of diversity as an
abstraction, but indirection, vagueness, and inconsistency when asked
to provide specific concrete examples that tie a particularly valuable
contribution to the gender or ethnicity of the particular board
member.21
As the authors acknowledge by their title reference to
"dangerous categories," some of this comes from the political
awkwardness of the question.22 It is unacceptable today in most
socially elite circles to doubt the value of diversity, so an abstract,
socially scripted answer is easy to give. But asking for concrete
examples prompts the tension about color- and gender-blindness-
board members are expected to be selected on merit, not for their
diversity, and thus the tendency to try to steer the conversation to
nonethnic or nongender explanations for the contributions. Where
white males are doing the talking, they are naturally reluctant to
admit that they might be less capable than women or people of color
ADMIN. SCI. Q. 60 (1995) (examining the effects of demographic similarity between CEOs
and boards).
20. See, e.g., Devon Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Race to the Top of the Corporate Ladder:
What Minorities Do When They Get There, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1645, 1660-62
(2004).
21. Broome et al., supra note 3, at 761.
22. Id.
2011] 845
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
by reference to a valuable insight or contribution that they could not
have offered. When women or people of color were interviewed (a
majority of the stories23 ), there was probably a reluctance to challenge
the white males by making such an insinuation with any specificity.
The fear of tokenism is likely to prompt accounts that emphasize
their contributions on equal terms with the white males, not on
different standards or dimensions. The dominant mythology for any
board is that those selected were the very best people available; if
they bring diversity, so much the better, but that is not the test for
selection. And to the extent that certain diverse board members got
to where they are in the corporate world by mimicking the thoughts
and behaviors of the dominant white males, they-by habit if not
cognitive dissonance-are likely to have internalized non-diversity-
based accounts of their own contributions to the board as a self-
esteem maintenance device. There may be some lingering anxiety
about that, but their minds try to deflect it.
But awkwardness alone is probably not the entire explanation. I
found striking in these stories the portrayal of board activity almost
entirely in terms of conversation that occurs in board meetings-
recollections of a particularly astute comment or contribution that
might have had something to do with diversity but really, the teller
quickly adds, is about knowledge and expertise.24 My strong suspicion
is that regular board meetings are places where almost no real work
of the board gets done except when the board is responding to an
external threat-and none of the anecdotes recounted by BCK were
crisis stories, or hinted the presence of serious power struggles.
Instead, regular board meetings are almost always routine and
ceremonial, consisting of seriatim presentations by senior managers
with a few minutes set aside for questions and discussion by the
board. These questions and discussions can be intelligent and
interesting, but probably of no effect whatsoever in terms of changing
anything about how management behaves after the meeting adjourns.
If one is looking for the value of diversity in that kind of setting, it will
not be found.
If we relate back to the various theories of board governance, we
can see why. The monitoring board-even assuming the absence of
capture-is likely to act fairly passively most of the time,
indistinguishably from the ceremonial process just described, until
some exogenous event (usually stock price performance, though
23. See id. at 769-70.
24. See, e.g., id. at 782.
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perhaps pressures from the press or regulators) shocks them into
action. Even then, much of the coalition building that leads the board
to take control is done over the phone or over a meal among the key
players on the board-what happens later at the formal meeting may
announce the result, but certainly not determine it. In this kind of
focused response to pressure, it is unlikely that board members will
display much that can clearly be attributed to gender or ethnicity.
The resource-dependency function of the board is also likely to
be hard to observe in the context of board meetings, because it does
not take the form of collaborative group work. Though some
examples of affirmative outreach to women or minority groups might
be recounted, the main ways this function plays out is through
signaling. Often, a director assumes the role of "hostage": the director
puts his or her high-status reputation with particular constituencies at
risk if the firm takes action inconsistent with their interests and
needs.25 Understanding the reputational cost of defection to the
director and the likely consequence of embarrassing that director, the
firm is less likely to do so-and the constituencies so understand.
Very little needs to happen inside the boardroom for this signal to
work. We do see a few glimpses of this from BCK, as when one
director mentions how another (minority) director wanted regular
reports on progress in minority hiring at the company.26 But that was
an awkward observation because although the director's interest
might be construed as value-adding, it could easily as well generate
resentment as pushing a social agenda in place of the normal
corporate goals of profitability and growth. This takes us to another
reason it is hard to identify concrete instances where diversity adds
value in the boardroom: the culture of the boardroom privileges the
language of accounting success and stock price performance, and it is
wary of contributions that are not expressed in those terms. No doubt
corporate law in many states reinforces this by asking board
members-as the price of business judgment rule protection-to keep
their eyes on long-term profitability.27 Board members probably learn
to edit themselves to keep to the legal model, and not wander
conversationally into awkward "other constituency" territory.
We are left, then, with the advisory function, and most of what
happens at regular board meetings (putting aside corporate
formalities and committee work) is meant to advise the senior
25. See Langevoort, supra note 7, at 808.
26. Broome et al., supra note 3, at 796.
27. See ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 123-24 (1986).
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management team on on-going strategic issues. Most all the stories
told to BCK were of that kind of contribution.' But as I suggested
earlier, the real value of this as a formal board function is doubtful.
To be sure, there will almost always be ingratiating nods, smiles, and
compliments to board members for their helpful contributions, but
the number of instances where board members' suggestions at a
formal meeting really change the company's strategic direction is
probably very small. After all, for board members to suggest some
move of strategic significance implies that management has not
already anticipated it, which is unwelcome criticism in most instances
(and hence management is motivated to ignore it). There probably
are very valuable forms of advice that come from particularly trusted
directors on sensitive issues such as how the CEO should deal with
threats from ambitious subordinates or negotiate the political
minefields of some regulatory challenge. But this advice is likely to be
expressed not in meetings themselves but in informal contacts.
Directors who are not part of the trusted inner circle will never
observe this at all-they simply take part in the formal routine of the
board meeting itself.
A realistic mash-up of these theories-my impression of
corporate governance in most firms-would be this: boards are
dominated by an inner circle of directors with a preference for the
status quo and close social and political ties to the CEO and the
senior management team. Other directors are chosen for resource-
based or signaling contributions, not to upset the political
equilibrium, although certain constituencies-large institutional
investors being the most potent-will sometimes be in a position to
cause change. Absent some unusual sort of external pressure, board
meetings are largely exercises in impression management by the
senior management team, in which board members are expected to
acquiesce by polite, intelligent, but not particularly challenging
discussion.
In the context of these kinds of meetings, I am not the least bit
surprised by the authors' findings that corporate directors have
difficulty identifying specific instances or ways in which board-level
diversity adds value.2 9 Where it exists, the value of diversity is likely
to be implicit and concealed from wide view; most of the time,
however, the board is simply not doing enough work for diversity (or
much else, for that matter) to be of observable value. In other words,
28. See Broome et al., supra note 3, at 786-92.
29. Id. at 803-04.
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the stories BCK were told reflect ambivalence not only about the
tangible value of diversity, but also about the observable output of
corporate boards in the normal corporate routine.
III. DOBBIN AND JUNG: IMPLICIT DISCRIMINATION?
As is widely recognized in the academic literature on board
diversity, linking statistically significant stock price or financial
performance (accounting) effects to changes in board diversity with
any consistency has been hard.3 0 That mirrors the literature on
corporate governance generally, where researchers struggle to find
evidence that formal changes to board structure consistently affect
performance."1 There are a variety of reasons for this-one, obviously
enough, is that optimal board-level governance depends, among other
things, on the motivation and skill of the directors, which cannot be
gleaned simply from demographic variables or background
information. The point is commonly made that best practices in terms
of independence and board structure mean little if there has been
deep capture of those serving on the board by the CEO and the
senior managers.
The other main reason is substitutability. For every important
feature of corporate governance, there are many ways to accomplish
the goal. Board independence, incentive contracting, and many other
possible governance strategies are part of a menu from which the best
available tools can be chosen given the firm's particular needs and
situation. So, too, with diversity. One can imagine a wholly white-
male board overseeing a company that successfully invests in a variety
of other strategies (e.g., executive hiring practices, management
consultants, or advertising) to gain the perceived value of firm-level
diversity. Conversely, for many of the reasons discussed earlier, what
appears to be a notable board-level diversity initiative might generate
little or no real value at all if there are no other firm-level initiatives,
especially when board-level diversity means just one or two women or
persons of color on a thirteen- or fifteen-person board.
That does not mean that diversity within the firm is not
intrinsically valuable, just that board demography by itself-
especially if measured in terms of small incremental changes in
diversity-does not correlate particularly well with any useful metric
30. See Rhode & Packel, supra note 1, at 9-10.
31. See generally Sanjai Bhagat & Brian Bolton, Corporate Governance and Firm
Performance, 14 J. CORP. FIN. 257 (2008) (examining the relationship between corporate
governance and firm performance).
2011]1 849
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
of such value. Nor does it mean that boards are unimportant to
investors. The stock price does reflect the market's consensus view of
the quality of the bundle of corporate governance strategies at any
given firm to counter managerial opportunism and entrenchment. But
most discussions of board diversity initiatives treat them as corporate
social responsibility campaigns, the pursuit of social goals distinct
from firm profitability or shareholder value-even though
proponents work hard to claim positive economic effects.32
DJ find a drop in firm value (measured by Tobin's q) after
increases in the number of women on the board, even though there is
no observable relationship between gender diversity changes and
subsequent operating performance in the form of return on assets
("ROA") that can be gleaned from accounting data.33 What could
possibly explain that? The authors conclude that this must be gender
discrimination on the part of investors, particularly in light of the fact
that the abnormal selling occurs mainly on the part of non-
blockholding investors, whose trading is largely outside of public
view.34 Investors with larger, more visible stakes, they hypothesize,
are subject to social opprobrium if they sell in response to such a
diversity initiative."
When I first read the paper, I was extremely skeptical of this
bias-based explanation, for many different reasons. One is that that
blockholders really do not face all that much risk of social
opprobrium from reducing their holdings. In most cases, noncontrol
blockholding investments can be reduced without any immediate
disclosure obligation, and by the time there is any awareness of the
reduction, there will be ample noise to obscure the reasons for the
decision. And the fear-based story does not explain why there would
be an increase in their holdings, which DJ find.36 There is also a timing
element to this. Diversity changes on the board are announced well in
advance of the annual meeting-bundled together with lots of
additional information-so any selling could occur before the
election, not afterwards, and have many possible explanations (none
32. See, e.g., Paul Tkac, One Proxy at a Time: Pursuing Social Change Through
Shareholder Proposals, 91 FED. RES. BANK ATLANTA ECON. REv., no. 3, 2006 at 1, 1-3.
33. Dobbin & Jung, supra note 4, at 833-34.
34. Id.
35. Similarly supportive are public pension funds even when they are not
blockholders, presumably because they are often visible proponents of greater board
diversity. See Rhode & Packel, supra note 1, at 23-24.
36. Dobbin & Jung, supra note 4, at 834.
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of which the investor is obliged to give). That part of the
accountability story just does not make sense to me.
Conversely, non-blockholding institutional investors (e.g.,
mutual funds and hedge funds) are typically under significant
performance pressure, and quite focused on value. Dumping a stock
in the portfolio, or even significantly reducing a major exposure,
involves deliberation and often mutual agreement among more than
one portfolio manager. Based on our earlier discussion, there is no
reason whatsoever to consider the addition of just one or two board
members-whether they are women, people of color or, frankly, pink
elephants-sufficiently important by itself to trigger any investment
revaluation. New board members are almost always chosen to
perpetuate the status quo (which presumably has already been priced
by the market)," and so their arrival is not all that salient an event.
The lack of salience of the addition of a diverse board member or two
is especially clear given the normalcy of minor degrees of gender
diversity on corporate boards today.38 We should expect a stock price
reaction only in the relatively rare instance where there is an
embedded signal connecting the new directors to a change in control
or strategy at the firm.
But DJ's evidence of a reduction in firm valuation is there, and
thus-assuming that this regularity is confirmed by other empirical
studies-we have to try to explain it. One disturbing possibility is that
adding women to the board actually is seen in the investment
community as value-reducing on average, which might explain their
observations for reasons having nothing to do with discrimination.
The asymmetry in selling activity between blockholders and non-
blockholders might then be the result of the superior informational
advantage of the blockholders, who might thus have the ability to
distinguish between new diverse board members as to their likely
efficacy and prevent value-detractors from serving. DJ purport to rule
this out by showing that there is no similar correlation between
diversity changes and accounting performance,3 9 but that may not be
a particularly robust measure of intrinsic value. Their measure is
reported ROA a year after the change,' which is not much of a time
lag considering the historic nature of financial reporting, a look
backwards at the previous fiscal period. Perhaps there is some longer-
37. See Rhode & Packel, supra note 1, at 16 (describing "in-group bias" as another
barrier to diversity in the selection of corporate boards).
38. Id. at 1-2.
39. Dobbin & Jung, supra note 4, at 834-35.
40. Id. at 826.
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term effect that does not necessarily show up in ROA the first year of
increased gender diversity on the board.
In a study cited by DJ, Adams and Ferreira offer evidence
consistent with this possibility, suggesting-counterintuitively-that
the diminished Tobin's q may be the result of the tendency of women
directors to overmonitor (i.e., do their jobs too aggressively). 41 As
noted earlier, there is reason to worry that aggressive monitoring by
directors mainly prompts managers to work harder to conceal the
current condition of the firm in order to hold onto the benefits of
control, a protracted negotiation that is costly to the firm and its
shareholders.42 That would be consistent with both DJ observations: a
drop in value on average driven by the inferences of non-
blockholders at the same time that there is no change in reported
ROA.43
That said, I remain skeptical of any claim that adding one or two
new female directors is likely to change the monitoring dynamics of
the board in either direction (though I might feel differently if we
were talking about serious diversity, i.e., approaching a majority of
the board, and without capture). So let us consider whether there
might be something else going on. One alternative possibility strikes
me as plausible. My sense is that there is significant fear in the
investment community about the role of certain institutional
investors-particularly public and union pension funds-vis-A-vis
"value" investing. That is to say, the concern is that labor and
government influence through blockholding investments may involve
the substitution of a corporate social responsibility agenda for one
focused intensely on shareholder value. If we were to assume that
these kinds of blockholders try to increase their influence by
promoting "their" candidates for the board and are more likely than
normal to choose women candidates, then what appears on its face to
be an increase in board diversity would instead be a signal of greater
public or quasi-public influence, and thus a departure from the
intense commitment to shareholder value. That perception, I suspect,
might well cause non-blockholding value investors to sell, with a
resulting stock price decrease. This would have nothing to do with
41. See Renee B. Adams & Daniel Ferreira, Women in the Boardroom and Their
Impact on Governance and Performance, 94 J. FIN. ECON. 291, 304-07 (2009). Adams and
Ferreira conclude that this type of monitoring interacts with other corporate governance
strategies and does add value when corporate governance is otherwise weak. Id.
42. See Westphal, supra note 11, at 512-13.
43. Dobbin & Jung, supra note 4, at 828-29.
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ethnic or gender bias but rather with fears of a noneconomic agenda
on the part of either management or controlling blockholders."
This is an area that deserves more empirical study. The DJ
hypothesis can be further tested by looking at substitute diversity-
promoting mechanisms to see if they have comparable stock price
effects.45 If there is indeed prejudice among institutional investors, we
should observe far greater stock price decreases when companies put
women or people of color in major management positions (especially
the CEO) or otherwise make credible commitments to enhanced
diversity where it matters-the senior executive suite.' That strikes
me as a much more powerful test of a taste for discrimination among
investors. If we cannot find evidence of bias with respect to executive
selection, which is very salient to investors, it is hard to see how one
or two directors could possibly matter.
Another interesting line of inquiry brings us back to the basic
question for the conference-whether there are traits or
characteristics associated with gender or ethnicity that might lead to
cognitive or behavioral differences in the boardroom. With respect to
gender, we might wonder whether women directors might have more
interest in the long-term value of the firm and more of a commitment
to the established stakeholder relationships that have developed over
time. Are female directors any less likely to agree to the short-term,
value-maximizing steps (such as selling assets or distributing cash)
advocated by aggressive hedge fund investors? Does the presence of
female directors affect the likelihood of disabling structural defenses
44. In the version of the article published in this issue, DJ respond by pointing out
that there is no significant difference in how institutional investors react to board diversity
that is the product of a shareholder proposal compared to additions separate from the
shareholder proposal process. If we assume that political or ideological agendas are
channeled largely through the latter, this would seem to rule out the political pressure
explanation. Their point is well taken, although I would not necessarily associate
ideologically motivated board changes with the presence of a shareholder proposal (which
are rare in any event, with only seventeen in 2010, all but one of which was withdrawn).
See 2010 Proxy Season Watchlist of Key Shareholder Proposals, RISKMETRICS GRP. (Apr.
8, 2010) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review). The point of the board diversity
campaign is to pressure for change without the need to resort to the proposal process. If
we assume the diffusion of diversity norms through social networks and other mimetic
forces, "giving in" could be viewed negatively by value-driven investors regardless of any
formal proposal.
45. Separately, a simple test for the robustness of the DJ finding would be whether
stock price increases follow resignations by female directors-easily determinable by
collecting resignation data filed on Form 8-K.
46. For such evidence, see Peggy M. Lee & Erika Hayes James, She'-E-Os: Gender
Effects and Investor Reactions to the Announcements of Top Executive Appointments, 28
STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 227,229 (2007).
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and agreeing to a hostile takeover at a high premium? I am by no
means suggesting that the answer to any of these is yes-I would
expect, once again, no appreciable gender differences-but these are
worth exploring.4 7 If the answers turn out to be yes, then we might
have a very interesting result. If the stock markets price and reward
mainly short-term corporate performance, the value added by
diversity in terms of promoting longer-term, sustainable performance
might be ignored and the stock price adversely affected-arguably
the result we observe in DJ.
That brings us full circle, to the possibility of stereotyping. Again
without predicting what we would find, it would be interesting to use
survey data to test whether investors of various sorts perceive the
arrival of women or people of color as corporate directors as a signal
that aims like stock price maximization or short-term profitability
have weakened at the particular firm in question. This would not be
simple prejudice but rather stereotyping women as a certain "kind" of
director more willing than usual to care about employees, customers,
and communities at the expense of extracting the last available dollar
of profit. That association might be salient enough to generate a
negative stock price effect. These kinds of questions deserve more
attention, and DJ are to be commended for raising them.
47. There is interesting research, for example, on whether managerial decisions
influenced by women have a greater "other-orientation" that might aid the firm during
times of economic downturn, but not during "boom" markets. See generally Emily T.
Amanatullah et al., Risky Business ... For Whom? Gender, Self- vs. Other-Orientation and
Risk in Managerial Decision-Making (Darden Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 1633978,
2010), available at http://ssrn.comlabstract=1633978 (examining how self- and other-
orientation among male and female managers lead to different outcomes); David A.
Matsa & Amalia R. Miller, A Female Style of Leadership? Evidence from Quotas (Nov.
30, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1636047 (discussing
Norway's required quota system of female directors and resulting greater stakeholder
orientation).
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